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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant and Appellee Dr. Kevin Brown ("Brown" or "Defendant")
disagrees with Plaintiff and Appellant Earl L. Cline IPs statement of jurisdiction.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §
78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Cline's
42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against Brown?
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Plaintiff failed to establish a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Brown?
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 did not apply
to Plaintiffs claims of gender discrimination against Brown?
4. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Plaintiff failed to allege a
common law conspiracy against Defendant Brown?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
For all four issues the standard of appellate review is identical. Motions to
Dismiss are appropriate for "failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted" and such motions "shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." The standard for the appellate
court's review of a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate granting of a motion
1

to dismiss is set forth in Earl L. Cline, II vs. State of Utah, Division of Child and
Family Services, 2005 UT App 498, 142 P. 3d 127, % 10. The trial court's granting
of Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "presents questions of law that [the appellate court
will] review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the [trial]
court." Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2004 UT App 485, ^ 4, 105 P.3d 963 (quotations and
citation omitted). Additionally, in reviewing the properness of the trial court's
decision to grant a motion to dismiss, the appellate court will ".. .accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non[]moving
party. We recite the facts accordingly." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, f 2, 62
P.3d 440 (quotations and citation omitted).
The trial court signed a final order dismissing all of Plaintiff s claims against
Defendant Brown with prejudice and on the merits in accordance with rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court also certified the
Order as a final order pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 1006). This final order preserved the issues for appeal.

2

DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CODES
There are two rules and three code sections whose interpretation is
determinative of the appeal. The rules are Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and 54(b).
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) reads in its entirety:
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue,
(4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by
further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not
required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert
at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) reads in its entirety:
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim,
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the
3

entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
The relevant codes are 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(2) provides, in relevant part:
Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two
or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter
pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or
witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended
or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of
any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or
indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been
such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of
impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due
course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any
citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his
4

property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of
any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws
42 U.S,C.A. § 1986 provides, in relevant part:
Action for neglect to prevent. Every person who, having knowledge
that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section
1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or
refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to
the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused
by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence
could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an
action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful
neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the
death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect,
the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action
therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for
the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there
be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased.
But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained
which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has
accrued.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about March 3, 2005, Cline filed a complaint against numerous
governmental and private defendants, including Defendant-Appellee Dr. Kevin
Brown ("Brown" or "Defendant"), alleging misconduct related to a domestic
relations action and child custody issues that resulted in violations of Cline5s civil
rights. (R. 32). On or about May 4, 2005, Defendant-Appellee Brown filed a
motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff-Appellant's claims against him. (R. 265). After
briefing was completed and a hearing held, Brown's motion to dismiss without
prejudice, along with that of other named parties, was granted on October 3, 2005.
5

(R. 651). The case proceeded forward with the remaining parties and claims. On
or about October 27, 2005, Plaintiff-Appellant filed an amended civil rights
complaint naming Brown as a party. (R. 704). On or about November 23, 2005,
Defendant-Appellee Brown filed a second motion to dismiss all of PlaintiffAppellant's claims against it. (R. 765). On or about February 9, 2007, DefendantAppellee Brown filed a request to submit for decision his pending motion to
dismiss. (R. 976). After briefing was completed and a hearing held, Brown's
second motion to dismiss with prejudice and upon the merits was granted on May
9, 2007. (R. 1006). The case proceeded forward with the remaining parties and
claims. On June 6, 2007, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, which
included an appeal of the final order granting Brown's dismissal with prejudice
and upon the merits. (R. 1014).
Even though there was a final order as to Brown, on or about February 8,
2008, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a second motion to amend his Complaint to add his
previously adjudicated claims against Brown. Defendant-Appellee Brown filed a
memorandum in opposition to Okie's Motion to Amend his claim on or about
March 19,2008.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Brown, in his May 4, 2005 motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum,
identified numerous failures of Plaintiff-Appellant's attempt to support Okie's
6

claims that 1) Brown owed a legal duty of care to Cline and 2) Brown breached a
duty of care owed to Cline. (R. 265, ^ 4-5). The set of circumstances giving rise to
Plaintiff-Appellant's 2007 lawsuit are identical to those of his 2005 lawsuit.
Prior to filing his 2005 lawsuit, Plaintiff-Appellant Cline was involved in
both a domestic relations action and child custody issues with his former wife,
Julie Cline.

During Dr. Brown's employment with SLVMH, he provided

testimony favorable to Ms. Cline, and in opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant, at a
hearing regarding a protective order and child custody issues. Plaintiff-Appellant
sued all involved parties for their alleged roles in his legal disputes with Ms. Cline.
Plaintiff-Appellant failed to cite any factual evidence in his Complaint that
supported his proffered theories that Brown owed Plaintiff-Appellant a duty of care
and that Brown's testimony was a breach of that legal duty. With respect to
Cline's claims that Brown was involved in a "conspiracy" with others, Cline did
not state any facts upon which a court could find that 1) a conspiracy existed, and,
2) if there was a conspiracy, that Brown participated. Finally, Cline fails to plead
any specific facts that even suggest Brown is a state actor such that Brown could
potentially violate Cline's civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986.
Based on the utter lack of supporting facts for Plaintiff-Appellant's claims,
the trial court appropriately granted Defendant's motion to dismiss PlaintiffAppellant's claims. (R. 1006). Plaintiff was unable to cure the defects in his
7

Complaint at a hearing before the Court on March 27, 2007. Lastly, in granting
Defendant's motion to dismiss, the court did so as a Final Order with Prejudice and
upon the merits. (R. 1006).
In the 2007 Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff-Appellant claimed
that Brown was involved in a "conspiracy" with others but did not lay any factual
foundation upon which a court could find that 1) a conspiracy existed and, 2) if
there was a conspiracy, that Brown participated. The only basis for PlaintiffAppellant's claim that Brown was a participant in a conspiracy was that Brown
provided testimony that proved detrimental to Cline's position in his child custody
dispute with his former wife. Nowhere in Plaintiffs Complaint does he cite
specific facts to lay a foundation for any legal claims involving Brown.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
The trial court correctly granted Brown's Motion for a Dismissal with
Prejudice and Upon the Merits on Cline's civil rights and tort claims because Cline
failed to state any facts upon which the court could find that 1) Brown owed a legal
duty of care to Plaintiff-Appellant; 2) Brown breached a duty of care owed to
Plaintiff-Appellant; and 3) Brown violated Plaintiffs civil rights claim granted
under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 or 1986. The existence of a duty of care owed
by Brown to Cline was never substantiated in any way by Plaintiff-Appellant.
Absent any facts to imply that Dr. Brown, a health care provider employed by
8

SLVMH, had any legal duty to Cline, the court had no alternative but to find that a
breach did not occur. The Utah State Supreme Court has clearly stated that u[i]t is
axiomatic that one may not be liable to another in tort absent a duty." Loveland v.
Qrem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1987). In this case, Dr. Brown did not
owe any legal duty to Cline, thus there cannot be any breach such that damages or
a cause of action could arise.
Next, Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Brown was acting "under color of law" fails
because Plaintiff did not provide any facts to the trial court to demonstrate that Salt
Lake Valley Mental Health is either a governmental entity or agency or a part of
the State of Utah. Because SLVMH is not a governmental entity or agency or part
of the State of Utah, its employee, Dr. Kevin Brown is incapable of acting "under
color of law." Since U.S.C.A. § 1983 applies only to persons acting "under color
of law," the trial court properly dismissed Cline's § 1983 claim against Dr. Brown.
Plaintiff-Appellant's conspiracy claims brought under U.S.C.A. § 1985 were
also properly dismissed by the trial court because Plaintiff failed to provide any
facts to support his conclusions that a conspiracy existed or that, if it did exist, that
Dr. Brown participated. See Amended Complaint, % 69. Given the lack of any
facts provided by Plaintiff to prove Dr. Brown's participation in an alleged
conspiracy, Plaintiff also could not sustain and set forth no facts to support his
claim that Dr. Brown had a legal duty to act under U.S.C.A. § 1985. Without any
9

facts provided by Plaintiff to support Dr. Brown's participation in a conspiracy, the
trial court had no alternative but to dismiss Cline's §§ 1985 and 1986 claims as
well. For these reasons, Plaintiff could not sustain any claims against Defendant
premised on violations of Cline's civil rights under U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986. The lack of facts to support Plaintiffs Pleadings affirm the correctness of the
trial court's granting of Brown's Motion for a Dismissal with prejudice and upon
the merits.
ARGUMENT
L

The trial court correctly granted Brown's motion to dismiss with
prejudice and upon the merits ail of Cline's claims.

A party is entitled to a dismissal of claims made against it for the "failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" and such motions
"shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "A motion to dismiss is appropriate
only where it clearly appears that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under
the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support their claim."
Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, Utah 1996, citing Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd.,
795 P.2d 622, 624, Utah 1990.
The general standard for reviewing a trial court's granting of a motion to
dismiss is set forth in Earl L. Cline, II vs. State of Utah, Division of Child and
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Family Services. 2005 UT App 498, Filed November 17, 2005, Writ of certiorari
denied Cline v. State, 2006 Utah LEXIS 82 (Utah, Apr. 20, 2006).
"In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to
dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,
in the light most favorable to the non[] moving party. We recite the
facts accordingly." Wagner v. Clifton. 2002 UT 109, P2, 62 P.3d 440
(quotations and citation omitted)."
Lastly, when presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "courts can and
should reject 'legal conclusions,' 'unsupported conclusions,'
references,'

'unwarranted

'unwarranted deductions,' 'footless conclusions of law,' and

'sweeping legal conclusions in the form of actual allegations.' Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist. 132 F.3d 902, 907, n. 8 (3d Cir. 1997).
To successfully state a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, a
Plaintiff must first "allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right.
Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law." Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100
S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).
In asserting a civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. A. § 1985, PlaintiffAppellant "... must plead facts with specificity [footnote omitted]. A complaint
which contains only broad and conclusory statements, unsupported by factual
allegations, is not sufficient to support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985,
[footnote omitted], nor is a complaint which merely restates the statutory language
11

of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 [footnote omitted]...." 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights $$ 180.
Civil rights claims of conspiracy that are vague and provide no basis in fact must
be dismissed. Conway v. Garvey, 2003 WL 22510384 (S.D. N.Y. 2003).
Cline was required to set forth specific material facts in his pleading such
that an opposing party would have notice of the claims against him. Plaintiffs
complaints only contained mere allegations that do not provide any factual support
of his claims involving civil rights violations. Therefore, the trial court correctly
found that, because Plaintiff failed to plead any facts with specificity that could
sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985, Plaintiff could not demonstrate
his civil rights were violated. Furthermore, a violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 is a
prerequisite to a finding that a person's civil rights were violated under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1986. Consequently, Plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action for
civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 means that Plaintiff also failed to
plead a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1986.
In tandem, the trial court was correct in determining that Plaintiff failed to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in
that he did not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted,
Defendant was entitled to a dismissal of claims, with prejudice and upon the
merits.

12

A,

The Trial Court correctly granted a dismissal of Cline's 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 civil rights claims against Brown.

A pre-requisite to finding a violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is that a person
was acting under color of state or territorial law. In this instant case, in order to
establish that Dr. Brown was acting under "color of law", Plaintiff was required to
demonstrate that Salt Lake Valley Mental Health, Brown's employer is either a
governmental entity or agency or a part of the State of Utah. Cline's 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983 civil rights claims against Brown failed because Cline did not provide any
facts that would establish that SLVMH is a state actor. Because SLVMH is not a
state actor, its employee, Dr. Kevin Brown is incapable of acting "under color of
law." Given that Dr. Brown cannot act "under color of law" he is therefore, not
"liable to the party injured." As U.S.C.A. § 1983 applies only to persons acting
"under color of law," the trial court properly dismissed Cline's § 1983 claim
against Dr. Brown.
B.

The Trial Court correctly granted a dismissal of Cline's 42
U.S.C.A. § 1985 civil rights claims against Brown.

Plaintiff-Appellant's conspiracy claims brought under U.S.C.A. § 1985 were
also properly dismissed by the trial court because Plaintiff failed to provide any
facts to support his conclusions that a conspiracy existed or that, if it did exist, that
Dr. Brown participated. See Amended Complaint, % 69. Given the lack of any
facts provided by Plaintiff to prove Dr. Brown's participation in an alleged
13

conspiracy, Plaintiff also could not sustain his claim that Dr. Brown had a legal
duty to act under 42 U.S.CA. § 1985.
C.

The Trial Court correctly granted a dismissal of Cline's 42
ILS.C-A. § 1986 civil rights claims against Brown,

Without any facts provided by Plaintiff to support Dr. Brown's participation
in a conspiracy, the trial court had no alternative but to dismiss Cline's § 1986
claim as well. For these reasons, Plaintiff could not sustain any claims against
Defendant premised on violations of Cline's civil rights under U.S.CA. §§ 1983,
1985, and 1986. The lack of facts to support Plaintiffs Pleadings affirm the
correctness of the trial court's granting of Brown's Motion for a Dismissal with
prejudice and upon the merits. In the instant case there was no evidence that Dr.
Brown conspired with others and against Cline to deprive Cline of any legal rights
he may have with respect to custody of the minor child he shared with Ms. Cline.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant and Appellee Brown respectfully
requests this court to affirm the trial court's decision granting Brown's motion to
dismiss with prejudice and upon the merits all claims alleged against it by Plaintiff
and Appellant Cline.

14

DATED this

It, day of May 2008.
DUNN & DUNN

z

iVIND. SWENSON
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Kevin Brown
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. 21(b), the undersigned hereby certifies that on the
date indicated below I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE DR. KEVIN BROWN, by the method
indicated below, to the following:

Earl Cline, Pro Se Appellant
6315 Fairwind Drive
West Jordan, Utah 84084

( X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

DATED this _$_ day of May 2008.
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

/

{^MJUC-U^

"Legal Secretary
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Final Order and Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice and
Upon the Merits of All Plaintiffs Claims Against Dr. Kevin
Brown.
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ADDENDUM
1

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State ef Utah
CLIFFORD C. ROSS, #2802
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-6666
Facsimile: (801)521-9998
Attorneys for Defendant Kevin Brown

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

EARL L. CLINE II,
Plaintiff pro se
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, EDSON F. PACKER and
SHARON B. PACKER, ET ALS. ,
INCLUDING DEFENDANT DR. KEVIN
BROWN
Defendants.

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND
UPON THE MERITS OF ALL
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DR.
KEVIN BROWN

Civil No. 050401710 CR
Honorable Fred D. Howard

This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 29, 2007 at 9:00 a.m. Clifford C
Ross of Dunn & Dunn, P.C, appeared for Dr. Kevin Brown. Earl L. Cline II, Plaintiff pro se,
appeared on his own behalf. Before the Court was the written Motion of Defendant Dr. Kevin
Brown to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Earl L. Cline II with prejudice and
upon the merits. Also before the Court was the verbal motion made by counsel for Defendant
Dr. Kevin Brown in open court and during the hearing that the Court expressly determine that
1

there is no just reason for delay direct and expressly direct that final judgment enter on all
claims of Dr. Kevin Brown and Plaintiff in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b). The Court
made its written ruling filed April 10, 2007 after having carefully considered the oral
argument by the parties and all pertinent memoranda and other papers on file. Being fully
informed, the Court now ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows:
L

The motion of Dr. Kevin Brown is well taken and is granted.

2,

Plaintiffs complaint, all amendments

thereof, and all other claims of Plaintiff

against Dr. Kevin Brown are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
3.

The Court in accordance with U.R.Cv.P. 54(b) expressly determines that there

is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that this be entered as the final order and
judgment disposing of all claims of

Plaintiff Earl S. Cline II against Defendant Dr, Kevin

Brown.

SO ORDERED and ADJUDGED.

Dated this Y?

day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this /<*

day of April, 2007 I caused true and correct copies of the

foregoing to be served by first class, postage prepaid, upon:
Earl L. Cline II
Plaintiff pro se
5128 West 12600 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84065
Earl L. Cline II
Plaintiff pro se
2225 East 4800 South #225
Holliday,UT 84117
Peggy E. Stone
Steve A. Combe
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Shawn D. Turner
Larson & Turner
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Unit B
South Jordan, UT 84095
Gregory B. Wall
Cory Wall
Wall & Wall
4460 South Highland Drive, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Stephen W. Owens
Epperson & Rencher, P.C.
Crandall Bldg., Suite 500
lOWest 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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